













Have Workers in Latin America Gained from 




















Centre for Development Policy & Research (CDPR) 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, United Kingdom 
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7898 4496, 







 The political economy of Latin America in the 1990s was dramatically different 
from two decades before.  Prior to the debt crisis,2 most governments in the region 
pursued economic policies that were essentially national, rather than derivative from 
international markets.  This was possible because of a range of controls over capital flows 
and regulations that affected imports and exports.3  Through the 1980s and 1990s, 
virtually every government (with the exception of Cuba) reduced both trade regulations 
and capital controls.4  Closely associated with this process of deregulation has been 
regional integration, most notably the North American Free Trade Agreement, which in 
1994 added Mexico as its third member.  In a parallel development, the governments of 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay formed the Common Market of the South 
(Mercado Comun del Sur, MERCOSUR), with Chile and Bolivia as associate members. 
 
 The purpose of this article is to consider what has occurred in labour markets 
during the twin processes of economic liberalization and regional integration.  The two 
are closely related, because they both, potentially for the latter and most certainly for the 
former, reduce the scope of national policy making.  The integration schemes were part of 
a wider process of policy change towards export-oriented economies, associated with 
accession to the WTO,5 and characterized by an alteration in the form of state 
intervention.  Thus, the economic and social trends coincident with liberalization and 
hemispheric integration arise from a range of factors, that include:  1) recovery from the 
debt disaster of the 1980s and its associated polices of demand compression (De Pinies 
1989);  2) a shift in economic ideology from active fiscal policy to the predominance of 
monetary instruments;6  and 3) a rise in the economic power of capital relatively to 
labour, in part the result of changes in national legislation. 
                                                 
1 Forthcoming in the International Labour Review 
 
2 I date this from mid-1982, when Mexico announced the possibility of a moratorium on its debt 
payments. 
3 I am careful not to use the much-abused term, ‘import substitution’, which is, almost invariably, 
employed loosely to describe an alleged similarity of policy regimes throughout the region.  Import 
substitution proper is an industrial policy, which includes far more than merely import restrictions.  As 
Liang (1992) has demonstrated, import restrictions are quite consistent with discouraging import 
substitution, for they can occur in a context in which the prevailing incentive is for production of non-
traded commodities. 
4 This deregulation was associated with conditionalities by the IMF and the World Bank, derivative 
form the so-called Washington Consensus (Weeks 1989, Weeks 1995a and 1995b). 
5 For a brief presentation of the implication of the WTO for developing countries as a whole, see ODI 
(1995). 
6 At the end of the 1990s, the neoliberal ideology added active monetary policy to its hit-list.  An 
extreme implementation of the ‘new’ monetary policy was in Argentina, which adopted a ‘currency 
board’.  Under this arrangement, the domestic money supply is linked to central bank holdings of 
reserve currencies (e.g., dollars).  In practice, this makes monetary policy non-discretionary, since the 
money supply is required to rise and fall with holdings of foreign exchange.  For over a decade it has 
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We first review labour market conditions in Latin America.  The review assesses 
whether wage employees have gained or lost during the major changes in economic 
policy over the last two decades.  Neoclassical economic theory predicts that labour 
would gain:  that trade liberalisation and labour market “flexibility” should increase 
employment, general deregulation should foster growth, and faster growth should lead to 
higher wages (see Horton 199; Hortonn, Kanbur & Mazumdar 1994).  To the extent that 
countries are labour abundant, wages should rise and profits should fall (the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem).  Were this the case, arguments for legislation to protect workers, 
indeed, arguments for the basic right to organize, would be weakened.  We find that quite 
to the contrary of the neoclassical prediction, the outcome for labour over the last twenty 
years has been extremely mixed.  Even more damaging for this position labour’s gains in 




Review of Labour Market Conditions, 1983-1996 
 
 At the end of the twentieth century Latin America was overwhelmingly urban; 
only three of the nineteen Latin language countries had a majority of the population in 
rural areas.7  While rural employment remained important in most countries,8 for the 
region9 as a whole close to eighty percent of the work force was urban.  The majority of 
workers in a majority of the countries were employees, not self-employed.  These 
characteristics differentiate Latin America from other underdeveloped regions, with the 
exception of North Africa and the Middle East, and a few countries of East Asia.10  In 
Africa south of the Sahara, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, the labour forces are 
predominantly rural.  In contrast, Latin American has passed through the process in which 
countries become overwhelmingly urban. 
 
 Table 1 provides the basic data on the distribution of the labour force in Latin 
America.  It confirms the importance of wage employment, public and private, in six of 
the eighteen countries of the region (including the four with the largest populations).  In 
1992 wage employment was, at the least, more than sixty percent of the non-agricultural 
labour force in each country, and almost seventy percent for the region.  However, 
                                                                                                                                                 
not been strictly correction to refer to the neoliberals as ‘monetarists’;  with their endorsement of 
currency boards the term becomes even more inaccurate. 
7 All were in Central America:  El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and for all three the urban 
population was greater than forty percent of the total. 
8 But not for all.  Rural employment accounted for fifteen percent or less of total employment in 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
9 Throughout the text, ‘region’ will refer to the eighteen Latin language countries (excluding Cuba) or 
some sub-set thereof. 
10 The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are also predominantly urban, but their transitional 
status place them in a category of their own which is obscured if they a included in the general term 
‘less developed’. 
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compared to 1980, the share of wage employment declined, by six percentage points for 
the region, which Thomas (1996) interprets as a process of  'informalisation' associated 
with liberalization of labour markets.11  This notable shift may indicate an increase in 
‘hidden’ unemployment; with ‘self-employment’ including people suffering form various 
degrees of short-time work. The greatest increase in self-employment occurred in 
Mexico, so large (from eighteen to thirty percent) that it suggests a change in definition or 
measurement error.  The possibility that the increase in self-employment in the region, 
substantial for Argentina and Costa Rica (Gindling & Berry 1994) as well as Mexico, 
implies an increase in unemployment is supported by our review of unemployment 
trends.  In the review officially reported unemployment rates and real wages are used.12  
The former cannot be taken as an accurate measure of levels, in part due to conceptual 
problems, in part as the result of method of collection, and, in some countries, a possible 
downward bias for political reasons.   
 
 
Table 1:  Distribution of the Labour Force in Latin America, 1980 and 1992 






















Argentina 87.0 73.7 20.4 92.4 66.3 25.9 
Brazil 68.8 76.0 22.9 75.1 68.3 22.5 
Chile 83.6 63.9 27.8 86.9 69.4 23.0 
Colombia 65.8 54.2 25.3 71.8 68.5 25.4 
Costa Rica 69.3 77.6 16.3 75.5 73.3 20.9 
Mexico 63.5 75.6 18.0 71.0 64.0 30.5 
















Note:  Non-agricultural labour force percentage from Food and Agricultural Organization, AGROSTAT.  
Division of non-agricultural employment from Thomas (1996, p. 88), based on ILO data.  The residual is 
given as ‘domestic service’ in the original source. 
 
The basic statistics for the urban labour market review are provided in Tables 3-5, 
with an overall summary in Table 6.  We begin the labour market assessment by reference 
to Table 2, which covers the entire time period, 1974-1997, for the two major indicators, 
unemployment and real wages.  For the fifteen countries (only thirteen have wage data), 
in only two was there a long-term improvement in both unemployment and real wages 
(Brazil and Chile).  For seven countries, there was an unambiguous deterioration.  In four 
of the seven, Argentina, Panama,13 Peru, and Venezuela, wage labour received a double 
                                                 
11 See also Arturo & Avila (1989). 
12 The unemployment and real wage statistics are from CEPAL (1986, pp. 24-34) for 1971-1982);  
CEPAL (1992, pp. 78, 81) for 1983-1990; and CEPAL (1995, pp. 50-51), CEPAL (1996, pp. 14-15), 
CEPAL (1997, p. 27), CEPAL (1998, p. 52) for 1991-1997. 
13 For a study of poverty and unemployment in Panama, see Calmanzon, Garcia-Huidobro & Morgado 
(1989). 
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blow:  over time more workers were unemployed, and those employed received lower 
real wages.  This result is quite striking:  despite major changes in policy regimes 
(dramatic in Argentina, Bolivia and Peru), the deterioration in labour market conditions 
was secular, not merely cyclical.  In three other countries, Bolivia, Guatemala, and 
Uruguay, unemployment showed no trend (i.e., it moved cyclically), and real wages fell.  
In the remaining six countries there was no trend in unemployment, rising wages in one 
(Costa Rica), and falling wages in one (Mexico).   
 
 Thus, the long run patterns indicate that wage labour in Latin America enjoyed 
rising real wages in only four of thirteen countries for which there are data; and in only 
three of fifteen countries was unemployment lower.  Further, for the thirteen countries 
with wage data, in only one, Chile, was the long-term trend in wages above the trend in 
per capita income.14  In other words, labour’s relative position in the income distribution 
declined in every country but one.15 
 
 An inspection of sub-periods (last row of Table 8) shows that only during 1974-
1981 did unemployment fall in as many countries as it rose.  Indeed, in the ‘recovery’ 
decade of the 1990s, unemployment rose in six countries, while falling in only three.  Not 
withstanding the tendency for unemployment to rise during this decade, wages also rose 
in nine countries, while falling in none.  If neoclassical labour market ‘flexibility’ means 
a tendency for labour markets to ‘clear’ through real wage adjustment to surpluses and 
shortages, then one should find rising wages associated with falling unemployment and 
vice-versa.  Yet, when one looks across countries and time periods for this inverse 
relationship, it occurs with a frequency that is no more than random.  This suggests 
fragmentation of labour markets, which is not the result of government regulation.16  In 
virtually all of the countries labour market ‘reforms’ were introduced in the 1980s to 
create greater ‘flexibility’ (see below).  The aggregate evidence suggests that there was no 
more flexibility in the 1990s than in the 1980s or 1970s.   
 
 In most countries the lack of ‘flexibility’ cannot be attributed to government-
created ‘distortions’ of the labour market.17  In the 1990s in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Paraguay and Uruguay, real wages rose without a decline in unemployment 
(indeed, with an increase in the last country), yet labour institutions and regulations 
varied greatly among these five.  The variations in institutions and regulations were, if 
anything, greater among the three countries in which we find the predicted combination 
                                                 
14 This is also the conclusion of UNCTAD:  ‘…[T]here was a wide-spread fall in the average share of 
wages [in manufacturing] between 1980-85 and 1985-1992’(UNCTAD 1997, p. 138). 
15 And in Chile, labour’s share towards the end of the 1990s was considerably below what it had been 
at the end of the 1960s. 
16 Case study evidence for labour market fragmentation or segmentation is found in Jatoba (1989, pp. 
50-51). 
17 In Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, perhaps the three most developed countries of the region, there 
has been considerable reduction of worker protection (Marshall 1997).  This has also been the case for 
Mexico (Moreno-Fontes 1996).  See Plant (1994, pp. 84-90, & Chapter 6) for a review of labour 
market policy in Latin America in the context of structural adjustment. 
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of rising wages and falling unemployment (Bolivia, Guatemala, and Panama).  The mix 
of trends and non-trends suggests that characteristics of the private sector may have 
affected outcomes.  One possibility is that wages rose in export sectors, while remaining 
stagnant in others (see Alarcon & McKinley 1997), but the disaggregated data to test this 
hypothesis is lacking.  Overall, one must conclude that labour market outcomes in the 
1990s involved processes considerably more complex than output growth leading to 
falling unemployment, which in turn, generated upward wage pressure.   
 
The simple neoclassical view that unemployment is the result of wages being too 
high does not stand inspection.  The empirical evidence shows that in deregulated labour 
markets wages behaved in the manner, which neoliberals would associate only with 
regulated markets dominated by strong unions.  An as will be discussed below, the 
strength of organized labour declined in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 7 
 
Table 2:  Urban Unemployment Rates in the MEROSUR and 
Andean Pact Countries, 1973-1998 
 MERCOSUR    Andean Pact    
Years Argen Brazil Chile Parag Urug Bolivia Colom Ecuador Peru Venez 
1973 na na 3.9 na na na na na na na 
1974 4.2 na 8.2 na na na 12.7 na na 7.6 
1975 3.7 na 13.7 na na na 11.0 na na 8.3 
1976 4.9 5.5 14.2 6.7 12.7 5.1 10.6 na 5.0 6.8 
1977 3.3 6.0 11.1 5.4 11.8 5.2 9.0 na 5.6 5.5 
1978 3.3 6.8 11.8 4.1 10.1 3.0 9.0 na 6.1 5.1 
1979 2.5 6.4 11.5 5.9 8.3 5.0 8.9 na 6.6 5.8 
1980 2.6 6.2 10.0 3.9 7.4 5.0 9.7 na 6.4 6.6 
1981 4.7 7.9 9.4 2.2 6.7 6.4 8.2 na 6.1 6.8 
1982 5.3 6.3 18.7 5.6 11.9 6.2 9.3 na 6.3 7.8 
1983 4.6 6.7 18.9 8.4 15.5 8.5 11.8 6.7 9.0 11.2 
1984 4.6 7.1 18.5 7.4 14.0 6.9 13.5 10.6 8.9 14.3 
1985 6.1 5.3 17.2 5.2 13.1 5.8 14.1 10.4 10.1 14.3 
1986 5.2 3.6 13.1 6.1 10.7 7.0 13.8 10.7 5.4 12.1 
1987 5.9 3.7 11.9 5.5 9.3 7.2 11.8 7.2 4.8 9.9 
1988 6.3 3.8 10.2 4.7 9.1 11.6 11.2 7.4 6.0 7.9 
1989 7.8 3.3 7.2 6.1 8.6 10.2 9.9 7.9 7.9 9.7 
1990 7.5 4.5 6.5 6.6 9.3 9.5 10.3 6.1 8.3 11.0 
1991 6.5 4.8 9.3 5.1 8.9 8.1 10.2 8.5 5.9 10.1 
1992 7.0 5.8 7.0 5.3 9.0 5.4 10.2 8.9 9.4 8.1 
1993 9.6 5.4 6.2 5.1 8.4 5.8 8.6 8.9 9.9 6.8 
1994 11.5 5.1 8.3 4.4 9.2 3.1 8.9 7.8 8.8 8.9 
1995 17.5 4.6 7.4 5.3 10.8 3.6 8.9 7.7 8.8 10.9 
1996 17.2 5.7 6.4 8.2 12.6 3.5 11.4 10.4 8.7 11.9 
1997 14.9 5.9 6.1 7.1 12.6 4.4 12.7 9.3 9.1 12.4 
1998 12.9 7.8 6.1 na 11.1 na 15.1 na 9.0 12.2 
Note:  Figure in 
borders is lowest 
value. 
    





Table 3:  Index of Real Wage Rates in the MEROSUR  
and Andean Pact Countries, 1971-1998 
 MERCOSUR    Andean Pact    
Years Argen Brazil Chile Parag Urug Bolivia Colom Ecuador Peru Venez 
1971 100 61 123 113 173 na 100 na 160 na 
1972 95 67 111 108 142 na 84 na 157 na 
1973 101 67 73 104 138 na 90 na 155 na 
1974 114 69 67 100 140 na 85 na 153 na 
1975 107 75 64 99 127 na 83 na 130 na 
1976 72 78 65 105 120 na 85 na 141 105 
1977 71 79 73 100 106 na 80 na 118 97 
1978 70 83 78 104 102 na 90 na 103 91 
1979 80 85 84 97 94 na 96 na 96 81 
1980 72 86 92 97 93 na 96 na 108 133 
1981 100 91 100 103 100 na 97 na 99 115 
1982 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 na 100 100 
1983 93 91 89 93 79 103 105 na 94 98 
1984 118 91 89 90 68 86 113 na 87 94 
1985 100 96 86 88 63 46 109 na 78 84 
1986 101 104 88 84 67 32 115 na 98 85 
1987 95 91 87 94 70 38 114 100.0 101 75 
1988 87 89 93 101 71 39 112 86.5 76 66 
1989 77 88 95 107 71 41 114 76.5 42 48 
1990 73 75 96 101 66 42 111 63.0 37 46 
1991 76 75 101 99 68 39 107 53.1 39 42 
1992 77 76 106 98 70 41 109 44.6 38 23.1 
1993 76 82 109 98 73 43 114 38.3 38 20.3 
1994 76 83 115 100 74 47 115 33.1 44 17.8 
1995 75 87 119 108 72 48 116 32.2 40 na 
1996 75 101 124 111 72 48 119 30.9 38 na 
1997 73 102 127 109 72 na 122 23.8 38 na 
1998 72 102 131 108 73 na 120 na 37 na 




Table  4:  Urban Unemployment Rates in Central America & Mexico 
Countries, 1973-1998 
Years Costa Rica Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama Mexico 
1973 na na na na na 7.5 
1974 na na na na 7.5 7.4 
1975 na na na na 8.6 7.2 
1976 5.4 na 5.0 na 9.0 6.8 
1977 5.1 na 5.6 na 9.2 8.3 
1978 5.8 3.6 5.9 na 9.6 6.9 
1979 5.3 4.5 6.1 na 11.6 5.7 
1980 6.0 6.4 6.3 5.0 9.8 4.5 
1981 9.1 8.5 7.6 5.9 11.8 4.2 
1982 9.9 9.0 8.8 6.2 10.3 4.1 
1983 8.5 10.0 9.5 3.6 11.7 6.8 
1984 6.6 9.1 10.8 2.3 12.4 5.7 
1985 6.7 12.1 10.7 3.2 15.6 4.4 
1986 6.7 14.0 11.7 4.7 12.6 4.3 
1987 5.9 11.4 12.1 5.8 14.1 3.9 
1988 6.3 8.8 11.4 6.0 21.1 3.5 
1989 3.7 6.2 8.7 8.4 20.4 2.9 
1990 5.4 6.5 7.2 11.1 20.0 2.8 
1991 6.0 6.4 6.9 14.2 19.3 3.0 
1992 4.3 5.7 7.6 17.8 17.5 2.8 
1993 4.0 5.5 7.0 21.8 15.6 3.4 
1994 4.3 5.2 4.0 20.7 16.0 3.7 
1995 5.7 4.3 5.6 16.2 16.2 6.3 
1996 6.6 4.9 6.5 14.8 16.4 5.7 
1997 6.1 6.2 6.4 13.2 15.5 4.1 
1998 5.6 7.1 5.8  15.6 3.7 





Table  5:  Urban Real Wages in Central America, Dominican Republic 
 and Mexico, 1971-1998 

















1971 115 124 na na na na na 88 
1972 112 124 na na na na na 89 
1973 109 109 na na na na na 89 
1974 103 95 na na na na na 92 
1975 99 87 na na na na na 97 
1976 112 85 na na na 145 na 105 
1977 123 80 na na na 139 na 107 
1978 134 85 na na na 133 na 104 
1979 140 85 na na na 131 na 103 
1980 141 85 na na na 115 118 98 
1981 124 94 na na na 119 110 99 
1982 100 100 na 100 100 100 100 100 
1983 111 93 na 92 98 101 95 74 
1984 120 84 na 88 92 105 97 69 
1985 130 73 na 85 65 106 94 70 
1986 138 59 na 82 23 108 101 66 
1987 126 64 100 80 16 110 99 66 
1988 120 67 100 80 6 101 105 66 
1989 121 70 85 68 11 109 89 69 
1990 123 58 80 64 17 102 86 72 
1991 117 55 78 63 18 101 82 77 
1992 122 63 81 64 21 101 100 82 
1993 135 67 78 63 20 105 95 89 
1994 140 68 80 64 21 110 102 93 
1995 137 76 80 64 21 110 108 80 
1996 136 84 73 58 21 na 103 71 
1997 137 na 70 56 21 na 114 70 
1998 na na na na na na na 71 
Notes:  A figure in borders notes highest value.   
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Table  6: Summary of Labour Market Trends for Fifteen Countries, 1971-
1998 











unemp rising, wages falling 
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unemp:  4, 4, 5  
(2 no data) 
wages: 3, 5, 4 
(3 no data) 
unemp: 3, 8, 4 
 
wages: 8, 4, 1 
(2 no data) 
unemp: 3, 6, 6 
 
wages:  2, 3, 9 
(1 no data) 
improvement:         2 
mixed:                    3 
deterioration:          9 
ambiguous:            1 
Note:  In the first column, the name of the country is followed by the dates for which data are available, 




 The rather disparate labor market outcomes call for a more rigorous analysis of 
the relationship among the variables, growth, employment and real wages.  To do this, we 
specify the rate of change of the unemployment rate as the ratio of an equilibrium rate 
(U(t)*) in the current period and the unemployment rate in the previous period (U(t-1)).  To 
allow for the likelihood that the unemployment rate in any period does not completely 
adjust to its equilibrium value, we introduce an ‘adjustment coefficient’. 
 
 u(t) = [U(t)*/U(t-1)]
φ   
 
Where φ is the adjustment coefficient, greater than zero and less than one.  If the 
unemployment rate is always in equilibrium, then φ equals unity.  The level of real wages 
and level of output determine the equilibrium rate of unemployment.  Both variables 
require brief elaboration.  The wage mechanism is based on the assumption that all firms 
operate with fixed coefficients (there is no capital-labour substitution).  In each sector 
there are firms with different shares of wages in value added, because of different 
vintages of technologies being used.  When wages rise, other things equal, firms that use 
relatively more labour suffer profit declines relatively to firms that use less labour.  As a 
result, some firms are driven from the market, and employment falls.  In the case of 
output, xxx 
 
U(t)* = U(W (t), GDPT (t)) 
U(t)* = [W (t)]
β1[GDPT (t)]
β2 
Where β1 is positive and  β2 is negative. 
u(t) = [{[W (t)]β1[GDPT (t)]β2}/U(t-1)]
φ
 
ln[u(t)] = φβ1ln[W (t)] +  φβ2[lnGDPT (t)] – φ[ln[U(t-1)] 
The model is estimated as: 
ln[u(t)] = α0 + α1ln[W (t)] + α2[lnGDPT (t)] + α3[ln[U(t-1)] + α4D90 + ε 
 
With the predictions that α1 > 0, α2 < 0, and 0 < α3 < 1, while the sign of α4 is not 
predicted. 
 
The simple neoliberal labour market hypothesis maintains that if wages are 
flexible, the labour market should clear;  and that rising wages will result from economic 
growth, as a consequence of a reduction in the excess supply of labour.  To achieve this 
end, governments have instituted a number of ‘reforms’.  The evidence suggests that the 
hypothesis is wrong.  In Latin America after 1982, even more after 1989, demand 
conditions in the labour market contributed very little to the explanation of real wage 
movements, despite increased ‘flexibility’.  A possible explanation is that greater 
‘flexibility’, rather than fostering employment growth, facilitated the ‘shedding’ of labour 
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in the private and public sectors.  One should not be surprised to discover that making it 
easier to fire workers (‘flexibility’) resulted in less employment, not more. 
 
 
Table 7:  Ordinary Least Squares Model of Unemployment 
Determination. Across 15 Latin American Countries, 1971-1998 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Significance 
Constant .121 4.05 .000 
DevTrdGDP(t) -1.897 -9.76 .000 
RealWage(t) .031 .79 .429 
Unemp(t-1) -.966 -2.87 .004 
D90s .054 2.23 .027 
 
R2(adj) = .282 
F stat = 28.08 
Sign of F = .000 
DF = 272 
   
 
 The evidence also casts doubt upon the hypothesis that an export-orientated policy 
is brings benefits to workers through real wage increases that are larger than would be the 
case within other policy strategies.  In the World Development Report of 1995, it is 
asserted,  
 
...[D]uring the past two decades real wages rose at an average annual rate of 3 
percent in developing countries where the growth of trade (exports as a share of 
GNP) was above average, but stagnated in countries where trade expanded least.  
World Bank 1995, p. 10) 
  
 When we tested this hypothesis for the countries listed in Table 2, by including 
exports as a portion of GDP as a variable in the real wage equation for 1985-1996 
(equation 6), the coefficient proves to be non-significant.18  In an alternative specification, 
using the rate of growth of the volume of exports, the coefficient is also non-significant.  
One cannot exclude the possibility that under alternative specifications of the wage 
relationship, some measure of trade orientation might prove significant; but this remains 
to be established.  On the basis of the measure proposed by the World Bank, we can reject 
the hypothesis that trade brings greater real wage gains than would otherwise be the case. 
 
                                                 
18 This is to be expected on analytical grounds.  The proposed explanatory variable, exports as a share 
of GDP, can vary across countries for many reasons, such as the well-documented relationship that 
this ratio is inversely correlated with measures of the size of economies.  At the least, it would be 
necessary to control this and other factors to rigorously test the hypothesis.  In the World Development 
Report 1995, a scatter diagram is proved with the export-GDP ratio on one axis and manufacturing 
real wage changes on the other.  A line with a positive slope is drawn in the diagram, but no 
regression statistics are provided.  From visual inspect of the scatter of points it is not obvious that the 
slope of the line would be statistically significant. 
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 Economic growth alone is an extremely blunt and limited instrument by which to 
improve the conditions of labour.19  This is especially the case because growth in Latin 
America has not been rapid.20  While by definition growth is a pre-condition for a general 
improvement of living standards, how the aggregate improvement is distributed among 
the classes in society is determined by relative bargaining power and influence on policy 
decisions. If workers will reap benefits from freer trade and capital flows, purposeful 
action is required to strike the appropriate balance between the power of capital and 
labour.  
 
This view, that growth is not sufficient to improve living standards of workers 
and, thus, the vast majority of the Latin American population, has been forcefully 
stated in a report for the President of the Inter-American Development Bank: 
It remains a source of amazement to observe. So little being learned form 
experience....[E]xperience should have taught us long ago that high rates of 
economic growth are a necessary but insufficient condition for achieving social 
objectives such as the creation of higher rates of productive employment, poverty 
reduction, the provision of high quality education and health services, the 
maintenance of the quality of life in urban centres, and so on... (IDB 1994, p. 1) 
 
 The authors could have added, economic growth will not provide workers with 
basic rights and rising incomes.  
  
 
Workers’ Rights in Latin America 
 
 The review of labour market conditions in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America 
shows that gains from growth were not passed to workers.  In order for this to occur, 
workers require effective bargaining power.  The labour market is a complex institution, 
in part ruled by economic forces, and in part by power relationships.  The role of trade 
unions is to redress the power balance between labour and capital.  The neoliberal 
literature, be it in the context of global integration or regional groupings, has a clear anti-
trade union bias.  One of the clearest examples of this is from the World Development 
Report 1995, where the following question is posed: 
 
How can policymakers create an environment that minimizes the negative effects 
of trade unions, while encouraging them to contribute to economic growth and 
equity? (World Bank 1995, p. 20 
 
 The phrasing of this question betrays an implicit presumption that in the absence 
of an appropriate regulatory environment, the effect of trade unions is negative.  One 
suspect that the same question would not be found in a World Bank report, were 
                                                 
19 For a similar conclusion, see Berry, Mendez and Tenjo (1997). 
20 A recent UNCTAD report points this out:  ‘Slow output growth [in the 1990s] has translated into 
growing unemployment and falling or stagnant real wages’ (UNCTAD 1997, p. 13). 
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‘business enterprises’ substituted for ‘trade unions’.  Yet the negative effects of private 
sector profit-seeking are well-known and documented:  environmental degradation when 
social costs do not coincide with private costs; repression of workers’ rights if protective 
legislation is not effective; use of child and forced labour; and discriminatory pricing if 
market power allows.  If the labour market is to have a ‘level playing field’, then 
protection of the rights of labour must be equivalent to the protection of the rights of 
capital. 
 
 The current bias against trade unions in Latin America reflects the political 
changes over the last two decades.  Throughout Latin America, and in some of the 
developed countries, the strength of trade unions has dramatically declined.  Neoliberal 
commentators tend to view this as a positive development, as a result of their perspective 
on the collective action of workers.  This predisposition against collective action by 
workers derives from an individualistic view of economic agents.  In this, the orthodox 
approach, all agents are seen as utility maximizers, they are all consumers.  The desire of 
agents to improve the conditions of consumption is a general interest of society.  On the 
other hand, as producers, agents work in different sectors and occupations, and their 
desire to improve their conditions of work is a special interest.  The economic policy 
debate is presented as a tension between the general interest of society as consumer and 
the special interest of producers.  It is on the basis of this interpretation of society that free 
trade is viewed as beneficial to all, and any restraint on private trading, domestic or 
international, as a manifestation of anti-social special interests.  In the context, it can be 
asserted that ‘international trade brings immediate gains through cheaper imports’ (World 
Bank 1995, p. 10). 
 
 The functioning of society is considerably more complex than this.  The neoliberal 
ideology ignores that unequal bargaining power among people as producers reduces the 
incomes of some and increases the incomes of others; by comparison, gains from 
consumption (lower prices) are usually trivial.  Once income gains and losses are 
included, trade unions become a vehicle by which workers as producers improve their 
incomes, to take advantage of the potential benefits of lower prices.  Treating all agents 
primarily as consumers also ignores the welfare effect of working conditions.  In the short 
run, the ‘working conditions of capital’ are improved by a deterioration of the working 
conditions of labour, because longer hours, more intense work, and reduction of 
workplace safety and hygiene tend, in general, to reduce operating costs.21   
 
 Along with the ideological emphasis on people as consumers rather than 
producers goes the closely related allegation that collective pressure for higher wages and 
better working conditions is not, in fact, in the interest of workers.  This rather startling 
conclusion is based on two arguments:  1) if such pressure raises costs and prices, 
workers lose as consumers; and 2) greater labour costs decrease the growth of 
employment.  These arguments imply that in the absence of ‘distortions’ from collective 
                                                 
21 But not necessarily in the long run.  Standing presents empirical evidence that suggests that trade 
unions can be a source of productivity increase and lower costs, through pressure for improved 
working conditions (Standing 1990). 
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action, competition among firms and between firms and workers will produce the optimal 
level of working conditions, wages, and prices.  This is an argument suffers from several 
analytical flaws.  First, it should be obvious that in any sector of the economy, whether 
gains from lower prices will convey a net benefit to workers depends on the simultaneous 
behaviour of wages in that sector.  Second, it cannot be demonstrated theoretically that 
lower wage costs will in general result in greater employment and faster growth of 
employment.22  Third, and most relevant, the free market argument ignores the power 
relationships between labour and capital.  
 
 Thus, workers rights and the exercise of those rights is key to a more equitable 
distribution of the gains form growth in Latin America.  The neoliberal literature tends, 
consciously or unconsciously, to misrepresent the extent of trade union rights and 
bargaining power in Latin America.  In its 1995 review of the Latin American labour 
market, the World Bank suggested that trade union power in the region is considerable; 
indeed, that the legal rights granted trade unions are disproportionate to those granted 
capital within the collective bargaining process: 
 
Most labour legislation in Latin America predates the region’s recent market-
oriented reforms...[C]ollective bargaining is too cut off from market 
forces...Unions propose a collective contract, and employers must respond.  The 
state is a part of the negotiations form the start, and the final agreement applies to 
all workers represented... 
In most Latin American case...the costs to employees of striking are low compared 
with those incurred by employers... 
[I]n some countries legislation requires that workers be paid even when they are 
on strike - a clear disincentive to compromise.  (World Bank 1995, pp. 19, 20, 21] 
 
 This description would seem to suggest that unions have the upper hand in 
negotiations, initiating bargaining with the support of the state, and receiving wages while 
on strike.  A review of trade union membership and labour legislation in the region 
suggests quite the contrary.23  In the 1990s there was no country in Latin America in 
which as much as thirty-five percent of the non-agricultural labour force was in trade 
unions, and only two in which union members were more than forty percent of the wage 
labour force (see Table 7).24  The average proportion across countries for the non-
agricultural labour force was less than fifteen percent.  If one uses the percentage of wage 
labour in non-agricultural labour from Table 1, it implies that across all countries the 
                                                 
22 For a detailed discussion see Weeks (1989, chap. 10) and Weeks (1991). 
23 Indeed, on the issue of payment during strikes, a table in the World Bank document reports that this 
was the case in only two of ten countries (World Bank 1995, p. 21), and in one of the two (Nicaragua) 
the law is not enforced.  Beyond this, collective bargaining itself  ‘is…in limited use as an instrument 
of social regulation’ (ILO 1997b, p. 161).   Table 5 shows statistics on trade union membership in 
Latin America, demonstrating the low, and in most countries declining, share of the non-agricultural 
and wage labor forces. 
24 There are data for only six countries for the latter percentage, but the percentages for the non-
agricultural labour force in the other countries imply our conclusion on the wage labour force. 
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share of union members in wage labour was about twenty percent.  In several countries, 
union membership was extremely low in the 1990s, less than ten percent of the non-
agricultural labour force in seven.  Further, active membership was typically lower than 
recorded numbers, and in many cases employer controlled unions (‘sweetheart unions’).25  
While trade unions play an important role in labour markets throughout Latin America, 
the low degree of unionisation indicates the need for increased protection for the right to 
organize and bargain collectively. 
                                                 
25 An ICFTU report writes: 
Because Mexican labour law makes little provision for the rights of individual union 
members, workers can be denied access to their own collective agreements…and have few 
remedies…[S]uch abuses lead to employer-dominated trade unions… (ICFTU 1997e, p. 3) 
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Table 5: 
Trade Union Membership in Latin America, Percentages, 1985 and 1995 


















Argentina 48.7 67.4 25.4 38.7 - 1.9 
Bolivia  29.1 16.4   
Brazil   32.1 43.5  
Chile 11.6  15.9  89.6 
Colombia 11.2  7.0  - 4.2 
Costa Rica 22.9  13.1 16.6 0.0 
Dom Rep 18.9  17.3  25.0 
Ecuador   9.8   
El Salvador 7.9 8.3 7.2  30.6 
Guatemala 8.1 8.2 4.4  35.9 
Honduras   4.5   
Mexico 54.1 59.6 31.0 42.8 - 26.3 
Nicaragua   23.4   
Panama   14.2 20.1  
Paraguay   9.3   
Peru   7.5   
Uruguay 19.9  11.6  - 31.9 











Note:  For earlier year:  Argentina, 1986, Dominican Republic & Mexico, 1989;  Uruguay 
1990; and Venezuela 1988.  For later year:  Bolivia, 1994;  Brazil, Mexico, & Panama, 1991; 
Chile & Uruguay, 1993;  and Guatemala & Honduras, 1994.  The numbers in parenthesis are 
averages for those countries that have data for both periods. 
Source:  ILO 1996, pp. 235, 237. 
 
 
 The low level of organization of labour in Latin America is both cause and effect 
of widespread violation of workers’ rights.  The box below provides a summary of 
abridgements and violation of workers’ rights in Latin America in 1996.  In Colombia the 
violation of basic human rights of the entire population, but especially of trade unionists, 
has been particularly endemic.  According to statistics from non-governmental 
organizations, during 1993-1995 an annual average of over two hundred trade unionists 
were murdered, the majority of which, according to the Office of the Public Prosecutor, 
could be attributed to the police, the army and security forces26 (ICFTU/IAROW nd, pp. 
2-3).  The main victims of the violence against unionists have been workers in the banana 
and palm products sectors, along with schoolteachers.  The regional organization of trade 
unions (IAROW, ORIT in Spanish) concludes that, in effect, trade union activities have 
been criminalized in the country, since a wide range of work stoppages are legally defined 
                                                 
26 ‘Security forces’ refers to the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS). 
 19 
as ‘terrorism’27 or ‘sabotage’28, and make participants liable for prosecution.  While 
Colombia is the most extreme case of violation of workers’ rights in the hemisphere, 
similar repression occurs in other countries. 
 
 The circumstances in which Latin American workers seek to exercise their rights 
would seem quite different from the impression given by the World Bank.  Even in 
countries lauded for their democratic institutions, such as Chile, restrictions on trade 
unions are substantial.29  In addition, the growth of employment in ‘free trade zones’, 
which has been important in the Central American countries, has been associated with 
limits on worker protection and basic rights (ILO 1996).  While the repression of the 
rights of workers should not be exaggerated, it would be accurate to say that in most 
countries the right to strike is restricted through legislation, especially in the public sector, 
but also in the private.  When work stoppages occur, strikers can anticipate violent 
confrontation, either with hired agents of employers or agents of the state.  Being a 
member of trade union invites discrimination and, in many circumstances, dismissal.  
Further, organizing a new union in many countries is extremely difficult, if not 
dangerous. 
                                                 
27 Decree 180 of 1987 defines terrorism as ‘Whosoever causes or maintains a state of tension or terror 
among the populace or a sector, by means of any act endangering the lives, physical integrity or 
freedom of persons, property, the media or means of transport...’ (ICFTU/IAROW nd., p. 7). 
28 Sabotage is defined as follows:  ‘Any person who, for the purpose of suspending or paralysing 
work, destroys, renders unusable, cause to disappear or, in any other manner, damages tools, 
installations, equipment or raw materials...’ (emphasis added, ICFTU/IAROW nd., p. 7). 
29 Chile has not ratified ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association…), and trade union 
membership in the public sector is banned (ICFTU 1997d). 
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Table 8:  Repression of Trade Union Rights in Latin America 1996 
Country Violence against trade unionists Legislation & Union rights 
Argentina 37 trade unionists arrested on 8 
August, including general secretary 
of transport union 
Presidential decree changing labour laws, restricting 
bargaining to firm level, allowing elimination of paid 
holidays & longer hours, reduced severance pay 
Bolivia Major strikes broken up by police 
Members of rural workers’ union 
arrested on 14 April 
78 union members (teachers and civil 
servants) arrested 2 April  
20 trade unionists arrested in October 
Labour code prohibits civil service workers from joining 
unions 
Agricultural workers excluded from labour protection, no 
legal protection of trade unionists against employer 
discrimination 
Brazil 22 rural workers killed by military 
police on 17 April 
union leader assassinated on 18 Sept 
Reform of labour law planned, to introduce ‘labour 
flexibility’, would make strike criminal offences in 
certain sectors 
Chile demonstration called by national 
union central broken up by police 
 
Colombia 80 trade unionist killed during the 
year 
Legislation proposed to repeal & amend provisions of 
Labour Code, breaking 1994 ‘Social Pact’ 
Costa Rica  Strikes banned in ‘public interest’ in parts of 
manufacturing and service sectors 
Government failed to keep promise to ratify eight ILO 
Conventions 
Unions in effect prohibited in Export Free Zones (EFZ) 
Dominican  
Republic 
 Pressure from US government brought improvement in 
enforcement of labour legislation in EFZs 
(only four collective agreements in EFZ, which has 500 
enterprises and 114 unions) 
Ecuador Army used to break up strikes Civil servants & other public sector workers in specific 
sectors cannot form unions 
El Salvador Army used to enforce employer 
lockout 
Strikes prohibited in public sector; 
Law passed guaranteeing severance pay in EFZs 
Guatemala Violent repression of unions in EFZs 
Trade unionists abducted & killed 
Level of effective unionisation extremely low 
State workers banned from striking 
Honduras Trade unionists abducted Government signed agreement with US to improve trade 
union rights for 75,000 workers in EFZs (end of 1995) 
Mexico  Anti-union drive by employers in ‘maquiladora’ sector 
Nicaragua  New Labour Code introduced, judged an improvement 
by organized labour 
No unions in EFZs 
Panama 17 trade unionists arrested Right to strike limited by legislation 
Employers in EFZs given three year exemption from 
collective bargaining 
Paraguay Ministry of Justice and Labour 
accused of violence against trade 
unionists; Police used to disrupt 
general strike on 2-3 May 
Public servants cannot form or join unions 
Peru  Protection against arbitrary dismissal eliminated, 
legislation eliminated guarantee of paid holidays, unions 
banned from political activity, strikes including general 
economic  social issues banned  
Source:  ICFTU (1997a, p. 38-63; 1997d; 1997e; 1997f;  International Metalworkers’ Federation 1994)
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Pro-Capital Bias in Integration Agreements 
 
While workers do not face violence in all countries, the incidence of repression of 
basic rights is sufficiently general, even endemic, that measures are required to create a 
‘level playing field’ for collective bargaining.  This is all the more important because, in 
the absence of specific and effective guarantees of workers’ rights, the integration 
schemes in the Americas, inspired by neoliberal ideology, tend to have a strong bias in 
favour of capital.  At the most general level, the pro-capital bias in integration schemes is 
demonstrated by the extensive consultation between governments and business interest, 
in contrast to relatively little consultation with the representative of labour.30 
 
 The existing integration schemes in the Americas do not provide workers with 
guarantees parallel to those of capital.  For example, NAFTA rules allow investors to 
challenge government measures by appealing to a NAFTA-level dispute tribunal, as well 
as to raise such challenges in the domestic courts of each country member.  However, for 
individual workers and trade unions there is no equivalent process.  There is a North 
American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, but its role is only consultative.  What are 
called ‘Group I rights’, to organize, bargain collectively, and strike, are issues for 
discussion, with no penalties for violations by either governments or employers.  
Violation of ‘Group II’ rights, minimum employment standards, discrimination, gender 
pay equality, and protection of migrant workers, also carries no penalty under NAFTA 
rules.  Only a narrow range of rights, in Group III, has penalties for transgression:  
workplace safety and health, protection of children and youth, and minimum wages.  
Even for these, the dispute settlement procedure is lengthy, over two years, and the 
penalties are relatively small compared to profits of capital.31   
 
 In MERCOSUR there are no formal guarantees for labour.  ‘Subgroup 11’, 
created as a result of pressure from national union centrals,32 is no more than a forum for 
                                                 
30 The ICFTU points this out with regard to proposals for a hemispheric trade agreement: 
In the context of the new processes of integration in the region, the government of the United 
States has announced the Initiative for the Americas...[I]t is cause for concern that the 
proposal of the US administration has not been the subject of consultation either with trade 
union representatives or other social and political actors.  Given the...exclusion of trade 
unions, the Initiative could constitute a significant step backwards for social policy and trade 
unions...affecting the productive base and worsening the level of unemployment and working 
conditions. (ICFTU 1991, p. 4) 
31 The labour provisions in NAFTA are also limited in that they deal only with enforcement of 
existing national labour laws;  i.e., there is no provision for harmonisation of labour laws, nor with the 
problem of non-enforcement.  Campbell points out, 
Neither the National Administrative Organizations housed in each country’s labour 
department, nor the NAALC Council of [Labour] Ministers, nor the NAALC Secretariat, 
were given independence or investigatory power to function effectively.  Campbell (1997, pp. 
6-7). 
32 An International Metalworkers Report comments: 
 The [labour subgroup] has been set up thanks to mobilisation of central organisations, notably 
in Argentina and Brazil who put pressure on their governments to have labour issues included 
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discussion.  Its recommendations are not supported by any implementation mechanism.  
For example, the subgroup recommended that MERCOSUR governments ratify thirty-
three of the basic ILO Conventions (if not already ratified), and compliance would be 
based on goodwill alone.33   
 
 The weakness of Subgroup 11 and the NAALC is in contrast to measures taken in 
the region to foster the interests of capital, both within integration schemes and by 
multilateral development banks.  In MERCOSUR, the guaranteed and enforceable rights 
of capital are in contrast to the absence of the same for labour (IDB 1996, pp. 35-40, 
Ermida Uriate 1997, & Daza Perez 1997).  To take but one example of action by 
multilateral lenders, in 1993 the Inter-American Development Bank created the 
Multilateral Investment Fund, in part to promote private sector investment.  There was no 
equivalent regional or subregional fund to promote the interest of labour. 
 
 In addition to the formal guarantees, there are a number of implicit benefits to 
capital of integration schemes for which there is no equivalent for workers.  Perhaps 
foremost, integration agreements facilitate the cross-border moment of productive 
capital.34  All would agree that the capital-labour relation, with or without trade unions, 
contains within it conflicts of interest.  Indeed, collective bargaining, when it operates 
constructively, is the process by which a synthesis of common interest is achieved out of 
the antagonisms of the two parties.  Free movement of capital provides employers with a 
powerful weapon by which to change the balance of power within the bargaining process, 
or, in some cases to by-pass it.  With no legal restrictions on capital movements, 
employers can use the threat of relocation to extract concessions from labour which 
otherwise would not be possible.  A study by Bronfenbrenner verifies the potency of such 
threats.  In a survey of five hundred union organizing campaigns and over 100 first 
contract negotiations in the United States, she found that union success was significantly 
lower for cases in which employers threatened closure of plants (Bronfenbrenner 1996). 
 
 In as far as the free movement of productive capital is motivated by a firm’s desire 
to escape to a location with lower wage costs, the functional equivalent or threat for 
labour, though not the counter-response,35 is strike action.  Employers create a work 
stoppage by closing a plant, temporarily or permanently.  Workers create a work stoppage 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the organisational structure.  Without that union pressure, the social dimension would have 
been totally ignored whilst it is plain that Mercosur will have adverse effects on employment, 
working conditions and labour legislation in the various countries. (International 
Metalworkers Federation 1994 p. 14) 
 
33 Changes in national labour legislation in the 1990s have occurred with little or no reference to 
Subgroup 11, despite the need for policy harmonisation across countries (International Metalworkers 
Federation 1994, p. 39;  and Mizala & Romaguera nd, pp. 4-10). 
34 We shall not deal with portfolio capital, for this would require a review of the debate over its 
possible destabilising role.  This is treated thoroughly in Larudee (1997), where a persuasive argument 
is made that capital market deregulation was a major cause of the ‘pesos crisis’. 
35 A strike in response to a closure threat might prompt capital to relocate more quickly.  Measures to 
counter relocation threats are considered below. 
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by going on strike.  For symmetry of rights, the free movement of capital would be 
matched by an equivalent right to strike, restricted only, as for capital movements, for 
genuine concerns of national security (such as in the army and police).  Yet in no Latin 
American country is the right to strike guaranteed to this extent.  A further right of capital 
enshrined in international and regional trade agreements is the protection of property, 
against unfair seizure by governments, abridgement of copyrights, and uncompensated 
use of intellectual property.36  No similar enforcement procedures exist for the rights of 
labour, which could be interpreted as a clear bias in freer trade agreements in favour of 




 Workers in Latin America have not shared in the benefits of growth, either in 
terms of reduced unemployment or rising real wages.  At the same time, their basic rights 
as workers have been progressively eroded.   There is urgent need for a Social Charter for 
the Americas, which would eliminate the grossest abuses suffered by workers.37  The 
charter would guarantee freedom of association:  to organize trade unions, to be free of 
intimidation if one joins a union, to select representatives by democratic process, for 
those representatives to bargain with employers (public and private), and for employers to 
enter into the bargaining process in ‘good faith’.38  These basic rights are not guaranteed 
in a most of Latin American countries;39  effective multilateral guarantees are required.  
The issue is one of symmetry between capital and labour.  Throughout Latin America, 
capital is free to organize itself into associations, to employ its resources to influence 
government policy, and through ownership of the media to present its views to the public.  
Extra-legal repression of workers’ rights is endemic across the continent. 
 
 Beyond these core labour rights, which are essentially the civil and human rights 
that democracies should guarantee their citizens, measures are required to establish 
minimum standards in the workplace.  The purpose of such standards is two-fold.  First, 
since the goal of freer trade is to increase the welfare of the population of countries as a 
whole, regional trading systems should put in place rules that discourage a competitive 
process by which social standards are reduced to the level of the least regulated country.40  
                                                 
36 Campbell concludes as follows on the protection of the rights of capital: 
[NAFTA] entrenches a set of rules protecting private property rights of investors...Virtually 
all types of ownership interests, financial or non-financial, direct or indirect, actual or 
potential, are covered... (Campbell 1997, p. 5). 
37 The term ‘Social Charter’ comes from the European Union  (‘Social Chapter’).  For more detail, see 
(ICFTU 1997b & ICFTU 1997c). 
38 In addition to ILO Conventions, these elements were codified in the US National Labor Relations 
Act of 1936. 
39 In a meeting in December 1994, Subgroup 11 of MERCOSUR noted that the right to form unions 
was not universal within the trading bloc (Mizala & Romaguera nd, p. 11) 
40 Campbell argues that current NAFTA rules encourage a socially destructive process of competition 
among governments: 
NAFTA ...intensifies pressure on...national and sub national governments to compete with 
each other by raising subsidies (most of which remain legal under NAFTA and lowering 
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Second, improved workplace conditions have a social benefit not captured by the 
enterprise through the market.  By reducing accidents and illness, workplace standards 
increase the productivity of workers, and reduce the health costs of society.   
 
Increased economic integration of the countries of the hemisphere has to date been 
a reactionary process based upon the repression of workers rights, and facilitating the 
concentration of wealth and power in the hands of capital.  If this is to change in the 
future, it requires a growing labour movement to counter the strength of capital.  A 
famous slogan of the labour movement states, ‘the cause of labour is the hope of the 
world’.  Never has that been as true as it is in Latin America today. 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulations and standards to attract transnational investment. There are no common rules 
governing acceptable and unacceptable subsidies or limiting subsidy wars among 
governments [to attract investment], and only ineffective protections limiting competitive 
bidding down of labour and environmental regulations...Thus, the need to attract investment 
creates dual stresses:  downward pressure on regulations and standards and increases fiscal 
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